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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
NOTES
Bankruptcy-States May Not Suspend Driver's License of Bankrupt
Who Fails To Satisfy Accident Judgment Debt
Adolfo Perez was one of 22,000,000 Americans involved in a traffic
accident in 1965.' Like millions of. other drivers, he had no liability
insurance 2 and only limited assets. When judgment was entered against
him in an Arizona state court, Perez was unable to compensate his
injured victim. He sought relief by filing a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy. According to section seventeen of the Bankruptcy Act, the dis-
charge Perez received released him "from all of his provable debts."3
When Arizona nevertheless suspended his license and automobile regis-
tration because he had failed to pay the judgment debt, Perez protested
that the state had denied him the full benefit of his discharge. The
Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act required the suspen-
sion to continue until the judgment debt was satisfied.' Furthermore, the
Act specifically provided that "[a] discharge in bankruptcy following
the rendering of such judgment shall not relieve the judgment debtor
from any of the requirements of this article." 5
Overruling two earlier decisions,6 the Supreme Court in Perez v.
Campbell7 held that this provision of the Arizona statute conflicted with
section seventeen of the Bankruptcy Act, making it invalid under the
'NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40 (1966).
2See note 53 & accompanying text infra.
'"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether
allowable in full or in part, except such as . . . [are specially enumerated in § 17a]." Bankruptcy
Act § 17a, 11 U.S.C. § 35a (1970). A discharge in bankruptcy constitutes a complete and adequate
remedy at law in the nature of an affirmative defense to any legal proceedings brought on the debts
which were scheduled in the bankruptcy proceedings; a discharge is neither payment nor extinguish-
ment of debts, but is merely a bar to their enforcement by legal proceedings. Helms v. Holmes,
129 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1942). See generally IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 17.27 (4th ed. 1971).
Judgments arising from negligent automobile driving are generally dischargeable if provable
under § 63 of the Bankruptcy Act, I I U.S.C. § 103 (1970). They are not exempted from discharge
by the "willful and malicious injuries" phrase of § 17a(8), II U.S.C. § 35a(8) (1970). This
conclusion is based on the dictum in Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 489 (1904): "One who
negligently drives through a crowded thoroughfare and negligently runs over an individual would
not . . . be within . . . [the 'willful and malicious' injury exception]." See also Lewis v. Roberts,
267 U.S. 467 (1925).
4ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1162A, -1 163A (1956).
51d. § 28-1163B.
6Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33
(1941).
7402 U.S. 637 (1971).
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supremacy clause of the Constitution. 8 The decision is a clear warning
that the Court will no longer tolerate legislative erosion of the safeguards
implicit in the bankruptcy discharge, but the major impact of the deci-
sion may be on the present automobile-accident compensation system,
already in a state of flux.
Financial responsibility statutes are widespread. All fifty states and
the District of Columbia have statutes similar in purpose and statutory
design to the Arizona Safety Responsibility Act.' In addition, two states
have grafted the requirement of compulsory liability insurance to the
basic plan, 0 and six others have recently combined compulsory insur-
ance and a partial "no fault" approach to liability." The basic financial
responsibility laws allow a motorist to drive without insurance until he
is involved in an accident causing personal injury or property damages
above a statutory minimum. After an accident he is required to post
security, in the form of cash or an insurance policy, sufficient to cover
the probable liability arising from the accident. If found liable for the
accident, the driver must also show proof of future financial responsibil-
ity, normally in the form of a certificate of insurance.'" Failure to meet
these requirements or to satisfy a judgment debt arising from the acci-
dent results in the suspension of driving privileges in every jurisdiction. 13
As the Supreme Court finally acknowledged in Perez, the financial
responsibility laws were designed primarily to compensate injured par-
ties;" their accident-deterrent function was largely a fiction. Unfortun-
ately, even before the Perez decision, the laws did not form an adequate
accident-compensation system. The plan leaves most motorists free not
to insure if they so choose. Only those who have an accident that is
8
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
'Comment, A Survey of Financial Responsibility Laws and Compenstion of Traffic Victims:
A Proposal for Reform, 21 VAND. L. REv. 1050, 1081-82 (1968).
"N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 310-21 (McKinney 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to -319
(1965), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
"Massachusetts was the first state to adopt a compulsory insurance law and has also had a
no fault law in effect since January 1, 1971. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, §§ 34A-N (1970). Five other
states have recently enacted some form of no-fault legislation, which is generally to be effective in
January, 1972. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1971, § 1, at 81, col. 7.
12Comment, supa note 9, at 1052-54; see UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE ch. 7 (1969 version). Most
states based their statute on this CODE.
"This provision is basic to every financial responsibility law; it is the ultimate sanction which
makes the statute work. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICIM 539 (Appendix C) (1965).
"402 U.S. at 644-48.
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reported to state authorities are required to insure. Reporting of acci-
dents is everywhere basically a matter of private initiative by the injured
party. When there are no assets or insurance to satisfy an eventual
judgment, or when some private settlement has been made at the time
of the accident, the incentive to report the accident is lacking, and even
the motorist who is clearly at fault is never forced to insure. 5 Worst of
all, the "first" accident victim has little protection. Since the negligent
driver can always elect to bow to the suspension sanction and leave the
highway rather than compensate the injured party, the financial respon-
sibility laws carry no guarantee that a judgment against him will ever
be satisfied."6
Until Perez the financial responsibility laws had withstood a wide
variety of constitutional attacks,' 7 although they had suffered a few
isolated defeats. 8 The overwhelming majority of courts have viewed such
statutes as a reasonable exercise of the police power and have thus held
that they do not violate the equal protection 9 or the due process"0
clauses, the right against self-incriminatibn,2' or the prohibition against
imprisonment for civil debt;22 nor are such laws an improper delegation
of judicial power z or special legislation.24
"Most states do have reporting statutes that require motorists involved in accidents causing
injury to any person or more than minimal property damage to report to the local police authorities.
E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-166.1 (1965); UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE §§ 10-106,-107 (1969 version).
Nevertheless, in rural and isolated urban areas compliance with the statute depends largely upon
the insistence of the injured party. Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensa-
tion, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 300, 306-07 (1950).
6Although the financial responsibility laws may be of no assistance to the judgment creditor
in this situation, he may resort to any of the normal remedies for nonpayment of a judgment debt.
In most jurisdictions, a judgment creates a lien on the property of the judgment debtor; the victim
may therefore obtain a writ of execution and have the property seized and sold to satisfy the
judgment. Of course, this remedy is useful only insofar as the debtor has assets to be seized.
17See Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1011 (1954). The validity of the Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act was upheld in Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963).
IsMiller v. Anckaitis, 436 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1970); People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d
180 (1961).
"Escobedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950); Williams v.
Newton, 236 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
2'Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941); Escopedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal.
2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950); Williams v. Newton, 236 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
21Surtman v. Secretary of State, 309 Mich. 270, 15 N.W.2d 471, petition for cert. dismissed
per stipulation, 323 U.S. 806 (1944).
22Sullins v. Butler, 175 Tenn. 468, 135 S.W.2d 930 (1940).
2Escobedo v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d I (1950).
2'Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 PA81 (1931).
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The conflict which the Supreme Court finally recognized as intoler-
able in Perez was that between the Bankruptcy Act and the provisions
of the Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act that deny a
judgment debtor the full immunity given him by section seventeen of the
Bankruptcy Act. Twice in the past, in construing state provisions almost
identical to those in Perez, the Court resolved the conflict in favor of
the financial responsibility acts. Thirty years ago in Reitz v. Mealey, 2
the Court upheld New York's statute26 which provided for suspension
of the judgment debtor's driving privileges so long as the judgment was
not satisfied and also required satisfaction other than by a discharge in
bankruptcy. Without denying the bankrupt-appellant's contention that
one of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to give the honest
debtor a tresh start,27 the Court deferred to the legitimate state interest
in highway safety and the protection of the public from the financially
irresponsible motorist.2 1 Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts con-
ceded that the financial responsibility act conflicted to a certain extent
with the discharge provision 9 but reasoned that dilution of the impact
of the suspension sanction would emasculate the act:
The scheme of the legislation would be frustrated if the reckless driver
were permitted to escape its provisions by the simple expediency of
voluntary bankruptcy, and, accordingly, the legislature declared that
a discharge in bankruptcy should not interfere with the operation of
the statute °
Although Justice Roberts' cavalier characterization of bankruptcy as a
"simple expediency" is not necessarily accurate 3 1 the problems he for-
saw if this door were opened for the judgment debtor now confront those
states with financial responsibility plans.
"314 U.S. 33 (1941).
z'N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 330-68 (McKinney 1970). The Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act contains the same basic provisions. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § § 28-1161 to -1178
(1956), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
27E.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). The other major objective is an
equal distribution of the debtor's assets among his creditors. E.g., United States v. Embassy
Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 31 (1959).
21314 U.S. at 36-37. The Court has long recognized the states' high degree of interest in
highway safety. E.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187
(1938).
1314 U.S. at 38.
-"ld. at 37.
"tSee text at notes 60-68 infra.
1972]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
More recently the Court in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety3
rejected another constitutional attack, this time against Utah's Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. Two creditor-control provisions in
that Act were even more suspect than those approved in Reitz-the
power to initiate suspension by requesting the clerk of court to notify
the Motor Vehicle Commission of the unsatisfied judgment and the
power to revoke and restore the suspension in response to the debtor's
degree of cooperation. 33 Again the Court acknowledged the conflict but
sustained the state legislation:
Certainly some inroad is made on the consequences of bankruptcy if
the creditor can exert pressure to recoup a discharged debt, or part of
it. through the leverage of the State's licensing and registration power.
But the exercise of this power is deemed vital to the State's well-being
34
Overruling these two decisions, the majority in Perez v. Campbell
considered the conflict much more elemental. The Court was aided in
reaching this decision by a candid construction of the state law by the
Arizona Supreme Court, which had repeatedly said that the law's "prin-
cipal purpose" was "protection of the public. . . from financial hard-
ship" resulting from involvement in traffic accidents with uninsured
motorists unable to respond to a judgment. 35 The legislation therefore
had little relation to highway safety; the major emphasis was on provid-
ing leverage for the collection of damages, even after the judgment
debtor had been discharged in bankruptcy. 3 Thus characterized, the law
was clearly in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act, which was promulgated
at least in part to give the bankrupt an opportunity to start afresh in
life, unhampered by existing debt.
32369 U.S. 153 (1962).
-Ch. 71, § 12, [1951] Utah Sess. L., codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-13 (1970). These
powers are effective even after a judgment debtor's discharge in bankruptcy, and state officials must
follow the creditor's directions. Id. By written request, the creditor places the clerk of court under
a duty to notify the Commission of the unsatisfied judgment; upon receiving the notice, the Com-
mission must suspend the registration and license of the debtor. UTAH COvE ANN. § 41-12-14(a).
With the creditor's consent, the suspension may be raised, but if the creditor subsequently with-
draws his consent, the Commission must reinstate the suspension. Id. § 41-12-14(b).
1369 U.S. at 171.
31Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 280, 380 P.2d 136, 140 (1963); accord, Camacho v.
Gardner, 104 Ariz. 555, 558,456 P.2d 925, 928 (1969).
'The Colorado Supreme Court had made the same observation ten years ago. People v.
Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 215-216, 363 P.2d 180,. 183 (1961).
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Writing for the majority, Justice White relied upon Gibbons v.
Ogden37for his standard in weighing the two laws,primarily to stress that
the two earlier decisions on financial responsibility were "aberra-
tional' ' 38 and to counter in advance the stare decisis argument Justice
Blackmun raised in dissent:
39
As early as Gibbons v. Ogden . . (1824). Chief Justice Marshall
stated the governing principle-that "acts of the State Legislatures
. . . [which] interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress
S. ." are invalid under the Supremacy Clause.40
The Kesler and Reitz decisions "ignored this controlling principle."' 4,
The Arizona law frustrated the desired operation of the Bankruptcy Act
by denying the bankrupt the full benefit of his discharge and is therefore
void.42 Justice White criticized the two earlier decisions for their myopic
reliance upon declarations of legislative purpose:
Apart from the fact that it is at odds with the approach taken in nearly
all our Supremacy Clause cases, such a doctrine would enable state
legislatures to nullify nearly all unwanted federal legislation by simply
publishing a legislative committee report articulating some state inter-
est or policy-other than frustration of the federal objective-that
would be tangentially furthered by the proposed state law.4 3
Furthermore, concluded the majority, even if the supremacy clause anal-
ysis of Kesler and Reitz-looking to the ostensible purpose rather than
to the effect of state laws on federal legislation-is accepted, the Arizona
statute must be invalidated because the state's expressed legislative pur-
pose is the protection of "judgment creditors from 'financial hardship'
by giving them a powerful weapon with which to force bankrupts to pay
their debts despite their discharge.
'4
The majority in Perez clearly seems to have the stronger position.
There can be no doubt that most preexisting tort judgments are prova-
122 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
3'402 U.S. at 651.
"'"I am not prepared to overrule [Reitz and Kesler] and to undermine their control over Adolfo
Perez' posture here." 402 U.S. at 664. See also id. at 667-68.
'0 Id. at 649, quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (emphasis by the
Gibbons Court).
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ble45 as fixed liabilities within the meaning of section sixty-three of the
Bankruptcy Act.4" Furthermore, such a judgment does not fall within
one of the classes of debts barred from discharge by section seventeen
of the Act if the driver was merely negligent and not "willful and mali-
cious" in his conduct.47 Since judgment debts are therefore dischargea-
ble, a state cannot create a device for their collection which survives a
discharge in bankruptcy. The federal bankruptcy power is "unrestricted
and paramount;" the states "may not pass or enforce laws to interfere
with . . .the Bankruptcy Act or to provide additional or auxiliary
regulations."4 Under the Arizona statute, the creditor whose judgment
claim has been discharged had a powerful ally in the State Highway
Department, which would suspend the bankrupt's license until the judg-
ment was paid. The state had given the creditor a remedy which survived
bankruptcy and had therefore interferred with the Bankruptcy Act to an
intolerable degree. As Justice Douglas, the Court's bankruptcy expert, 4
observed in dissent to the Reitz decision thirty years ago, "[i]n practical
effect the bankrupt may be in as bad, or even worse, a position than if
the state had made it possible for a creditor to attach his future wages.
Such a device would clearly contravene the Bankruptcy Act.""0
The significance of the Perez ruling might easily be overlooked
because the Supreme Court invalidated only one small sub-section of the
Arizona Act, not the entire financial responsibility statute. In the
writer's opinion, however, that sub-section was the keystone of a com-
plex accident compensation scheme.5' By removing it the Supreme Court
may have added new impetus to what is developing as the most powerful
movement for reform of the automobile insurance laws in forty
years.52  Largely as a result of the free choice and the slippage in acci-
4Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467 (1925).
41Bankruptcy Act § 63, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
7Id. § 17a, 11 U.S.C. § 35a (1970); see note 3 supra.
"8 lnternational Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).
41"Justice Douglas doubtless brought to the Supreme Court a greater knowledge of the law
and practice of bankruptcy than any justice who had preceeded or any who has followed him."
Countryman, Justice Douglas: Expositor of the Bankruptcy Law, 16 U.C.L.A.L. Ruv. 773-74
(1969).
-°314 U.S. at 41-42.
"See Justice Roberts' reference to the importance of an undiluted suspension sanction in text
preceding note 30 supra.
52Widespread criticism of early state insurance laws resulted in adoption of the original finan-
cial responsibility laws almost forty years ago. The first of the financial responsibility statutes was
enacted in Connecticut in 1925. Ch. 183, [1925] Conn. Pub. Acts 3956 (now codified at CONN. GEN.
[Vol. 50
BANKRUPTCY-DRIVERS' LICENSES
dent reporting under the financial responsibility laws, approximately
fifteen percent of all drivers in the United States have no liability insur-
ance.53 This figure represents seventeen million drivers. 54 A motorist with
even moderate assets will normally buy insurance to cover a possible
adverse liability judgment, whereas the uninsured usually lack sufficient
assets to satisfy even an atypically small adverse liability judgment.55
They are effectively "judgment proof" in the language of the tort law-
yer. As a noted torts authority has said, they are also our worst drivers:
It is also undoubtedly true that uninsured drivers on the highway are
those who tend on the whole to be driving unsafe vehicles, to be the
most slipshod, law-violating and reckless, and to cause a dispropor-
tionately large percentage of the accients.5 6
When liability fell on an uninsured driver, the plight of the traffic
victim in a financial responsibility state was bleak enough before Perez.
7
In such a case the only leverage an injured person had was the threat of
permanent suspension of the judgment debtor's license and registration
if the judgment was not at least partially satisfied. Perez effectively
undercuts that sanction. As noted above, the uninsured are normally
judgment proof and without assets. Faced with a judgment debt which
could easily be 25,000 dollars, the debtor now has two choices. If he
cannot satisfy the judgment but is nevertheless reluctant to be adjudged
a bankrupt, he will lose his driving privilege permanently or at least until
STAT. ANN. §§ 14-112 to -133 (1970)). The scheme swept through at least thirty states in one wave
between 1925 and 1935. Aberg, Effects of and Problems Arising from Financial Responsibility
Laws, 1943 INS. L.J. 72.
ONAT'L UNDERWRITER, Sept. 6, 1968, at 13. But the Department of Transportation estimated
that twenty percent of the vehicles in the United States were uninsured as of 1967. W. YOUNG,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 69 (1971). The great variation between states
is seen in the estimate of thirty-five percent uninsured in Texas, Loiseaux, Innocent Victims 1959,
38 TEx. L. REV. 154 n.5 (1959), and only one percent uninsured in Massachusetts, Note,
Compensation Problems Created by Financially Irresponsible Motorists, 66 IARV. L. REV. 1300,
1307 (1953).
"In 1970 there were 11,000,000 licensed drivers in the United States. NATIONAL SAFETY
COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40 (1971).
OGrad, supra note 15, at 311.
"v. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 85, at 578-79 (3d ed. 1964).
7"When there is no insurance, therefore, the present system falls far short of affording com-
pensation even in those cases where there is a theoretical legal right to it." James & Law,
Compensation for Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too Little & Too Late, 26 CONN. B.J. 70,
78-79 (1952).
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the debt is paid." If he is willing and financially able to file a bankruptcy
petition, however, he will recover his license and registration when the
discharge is granted. The seventeen million drivers who, like Adolfo
Perez, are uninsured and without assets have been given the opportunity
for one "free" accident every six years. 9
This is not to say that the escape from liability offered by the
"simple expediency of voluntary bankruptcy"60 is without expense or
limitations. Not only is discharge available to a debtor only once every
six years,6' but, contrary to popular belief, a bankruptcy proceeding is
priced beyond the reach of the totally indigent.12 The debtor must pay a
filing fee of fifty dollars before receiving his discharge, 3 and attorney's
fees for an uncomplicated voluntary bankruptcy range from 250 to 350
dollars." For these reasons, bankruptcy experts advise that bankruptcy
should not be considered unless the debtor owes at least one thousand
dollars of "disposable debts."65 During the bankruptcy proceedings, the
debtor must surrender to the trustee in bankruptcy all of his property
SUnder most financial responsibility laws, the judgment debtor need satisfy the liability judg-
ment against him only up to a stautory limit to avoid suspension of his license; the normal limit is
$20,000 for two or more personal injuries and $5,000 property damage. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT,
§ 28-1164 (Supp. 1970); UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 7-316 (1969 version).
59A discharge is available to a debtor only once every six years. Bankruptcy Act § I Ic(5), I I
U.S.C. § 32c(5) (1970).
6Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 37 (1941). See text preceding note 30 supra.
"Bankruptcy Act § 1 c(5), 11 U.S.C. § 32c(5) (1970).
'2There is at least a discernable trend in the lower federal courts toward a sharp reduction in
costs for the "poor" bankrupt. In the first ruling on the question of access by indigents to bank-
ruptcy proceedings since the landmark decision of Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), it
was held that bankruptcy, like divorce in Boddie, is a "fundamental" right which cannot be denied
an indigent. As applied to indigent bankruptcy petitioners, the statutory requirement of prepayment
of a filing fee to obtain a discharge violates the fifth amendment right to due process, including
equal protection. In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Without benefit of the Boddie
decision, two other federal courts recently split on the same constitutional question. In re Garland,
428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 966 (1971) (filing-fee requirement not denial
of due process); In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971) (filing-fee requirement is denial of
equal protection).
63Bankruptcy Act §§ 40c(l), 48c, 52a, I U.S.C. §§ 68c(l), 76c, 80a (1970).
"D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 59 (1963). This is not an assignment which
legal aid lawyers will normally perform for a welfare client. But see note 62 supra. If this new line
of cases is upheld, poverty lawyers may be expected to undertake bankruptcies as they are beginning
to handle divorces for indigent clients.
""Disposable debts" are defined as "those the debtor need not pay after bankruptcy either
as a matter of law or of practical necessity. . . . [T]his means [the debtor] should enjoy a net gain
of at least $1000 in his economic condition by elimination of indebtedness." D. CowANs, supra
note 64.
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except that which is exempted under state statute or under section sev-
enty of the Bankruptcy Act; the proceeds from the liquidation of the
bankrupt's estate are distributed among his creditors."6 It is this writer's
contention that the typical uninsured motorist will not have sufficient
assets over and above those that are exempt to make this collection and
distribution a threat to the debtor's status or a significant benefit to his
creditors, including the injured victim.6 7 Finally in most jurisdictions the
negligent driver will have to carry liability insurance to protect the mo-
toring public in the future, but only for one to three years after the
accident.6 8
Hopefully, the states that had relied on a financial responsibility
law to protect the driving public from the financially irresponsible mo-
torist will realize that the Perez decision has undercut the only sanction
in an already imperfect law and will therefore be more open to sugges-
tions for major reform in their insurance law. If new legislation is not
enacted, thousands of Americans will be killed and maimed on the high-
ways each year without adequate compensation for their injuries. Even
if they are involved in accidents only in proportion to their numbers on
the roads, uninsured motorists will be involved in some 2,400,000 acci-
dents resulting in 8,100 deaths and 26,250 permanent disabilities this
year and every year in the foreseeable future.69
The decision in Perez v. Campbell was a sound one from the point
of view of bankruptcy law; it protects the discharged debtor from what
had become a flagrant erosion of the protection promised him under the
Bankruptcy Act. Concomitantly, however, the decision left the individ-
ual injured by an uninsured motorist with much less protection and hope
for compensation than before. By opening wide the door through which
6OBankruptcy Act §§ 47a, 60, 67, 70, 11 U.S.C. §§ 75a, 96, 107, 110 (1970). See cases cited
note 27 supra.
"Eighty-eight percent of all consumer bankruptcy cases are "no assets" or "nominal assets"
situations. Countryman, Chapter XIII Wage Earners' Plans: Past, Present and Future, 18
CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 275 (1969).
"Most financial responsibility laws allow the negligent driver to operate a motor vehicle
without proof of financial responsibility three years after the date such proof was first required of
him if he has not had another accident during that period. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 28-1178 (1956);
UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 7-335 (1969 version).
"There were 54,800 motor vehicle deaths in 1970 and 2,000,000 disabling injuries; 175,000
persons suffered permanent impairments. Total economic loss from the 16,000,000 auto accidents
was S 13,600,000,000. There have been more than 52,000 deaths per year for the past five years.
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FAcTs 3,5,15,40 (1971).
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financially irresponsible motorists may escape liability for their negli-
gence, the Supreme Court may have unwittingly added new momentum
to the drive for wholesale reform of our automobile accident compensa-
tion system.
THOMAS A. LEMLY
Constitutional Law-Bar Admissions-New Standards for Inquiry into
Applicants' Associations and Beliefst
Bar associations have long conducted inquiries into the associations
and beliefs of applicants and excluded those "subversives" likely to be
a threat to the judicial system. I Since the first amendment applies to the
states 2 and protects the rights of belief and association, constitutional
problems arise when the state attempts to probe into this area. In Febru-
ary 1971 the United States Supreme Court decided three cases dealing
with the power of state bar associations to compel answers to questions
about the political associations of bar applicants. In Baird v. State Bar3
and In re Stolar4 questions posed by the Arizona 5 and Ohio6 bars were
held to be overly broad because they touched upon innocent as well as
tThe potential effects of the primary cases used here were analyzed while appeals to the
Supreme Court were pending in Note, Attorneys-Admission to the Bar-Consideration of the
Constitutionality of Bar Examiners' Inquiries into Political Associations and Beliefs, 48 N.C.L.
REv. 932 (1970). Having come before the highest court, they now deserve further consideration.
'Remarks of Hon. Samuel J. Kanner, Chairman of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, in
54 THE BRIEF 153, 154-55 (1959).
2E.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958).
3401 U.S. 1 (1971).
'401 U.S. 23 (1971).
'Question 25 of the Arizona examination asks: "List all organizations, associations and club
[sic] (other than bar associations) of which you are or have been a member since attaining the age
of sixteen years." Question 27 asks: "Are you now or have you ever been a member of the
Communist Party or any organization that advocates the overthrow of the United States by force
or violence?" ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN., S. CT. RuiE 28(c), Exhibit A (Supp. 1970-71). Mrs. Baird
answered Question 25 satisfactorily but refused to answer Question 27. 401 U.S. at 4-5.
'Stolar declined to answer the following questions:
12. State whether you have been or presently are. . .(g) a member of any organization
which advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States by force ....
13. List the names and addresses of all clubs, societies or organizations of which you
are or have been a member. 7. List the names and address of all clubs, societies or
organizations of which you are or have become a member since registering as a law
student.
401 U.S. at 27.
